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Our knowlccige  about the harmful effects of  Proportionately fewer women than men are
minimum wage regulations has been strongly  affected by the minimum wage because women
influenced by statistical evidence from the  withdraw from the labor force and remain unem-
industrial countries - which is often based on  ployed - or work in the informal sector and
indirect estimates that do not take into account  productive activities not accounted for in labor
the many "discouraged job seekers" who with-  statistics.
draw from the labor force (and statistical
samples) because of minimum wage regulations.  Minimum wage regulations should probably
Minimum wage regulations are probab:y more  not apply to young or unskilled workers or
harmful than economists have assumed them to  apprentices.  It is less important to guarantee un-
be.  skilled workers a minimum wage and more
important to provide them with training that will
Government regulation of the minimury  increase their chances of rising above the need
wage is most likely to limit the job prospi.cts of  for wage protection.
young and uneducated or unskilled workers.
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I.  Introduction
Recently,  notable  attention  has  been lent  to the  role  played  by  minimum
wage (MW)  in the  process  of  macroeconomic  adjus'tuen*.  The  current  professional
wisdom  highlights  the  important  effect  of  MWa in raising  total  labor  costs  and
in  contributing  to open  unemployment.  Moreover,  in a  dynamic  context,  it  is
believed  that  MWs introduce  rigidities  in the  wages  structure  across  industries,
thereby  hindering  smoother  intersectoral  labor  reallocation.  The  policy
implication  has  been rather  straightforward:  maintain  a low  real  MW.
Although  a great  deal  is  known  about  the  macroeconomic  effects  of the
MW,  our  understanding  of how  they  work in terms  of  microeconomic  foundations  is
rather  limited. In  particular,  the  effect  of  MWs on the  unemployment  and  on the
employment  probabilities  of specific  labor  force  groups  has  not  been  clearly
assessed  in  the  case  of developing  countries.  Our  empirical  knowledge  on this
issue  has  been strongly  influenced  by the  statistical  evidence  obtained  from
industrial  countries  which,  in  turn,  has  notably  relied  on indirect  estimating
techniques.
In this  paper,  we undertake  a statistical  analysis  of the  effect  of  MWs
on  different  population  groups. The  underlying  question  for  this  analysis
relates  to the  probable  bias  exerted  by certain  protective  government  regulacuon
in terms  of the  unemployment  prospects  of specific  groups. We use  several
cross-sectional  data  and  a standard  human  capital  model  corrected  for
selectivity  bias  to analyze  the  case  of Chile,  where  high structural
unemployment  has  been  a remarkable  feature  of the  1970s  and  19809. Our  main
conclusions  show  that  the  coverage  of the  MW is  more  s.gnificant  for  the  young
and  the  less  educated,  and  there  exists  a  negative  relationship  between  human
capital  stock  and  actual  coverage  of  MWs.  We also  show  that  previous2
statistical  analysis  of this  issue,  both  in the  case  of  Chile  and  in industrial
countries  may  htve  underestimated  the  negative  impact  of  MWs  because  they  do not
correct  for  selectivity  bias.
II.  The  Issue
Two  distinct  methodologies  have  prevailed  in  analyzing  the  impact  of
MWs in  the  economy. 1 In cross-sectional  studies  different  MW levels  prevailing
across  regions  (states)  are  correlated  with other  observed  labor  market
outcomes,  thus  providing  some  policy  implications  on the  basis  of specifli  labor
force  groups  being  affected. Studies  by Osterman  (1979),  Cunningham  (;  and
Lang (1982)  are  very  much in this  vein;  also  those  by Freeman  (1979)  and  Mvyer
and  Wise (1981)  for  the  specific  case  of the  young. A variant  in the
application  of this  methodolog7  is  offered  by Linneman  (1982)  who  uses  cross-
sectional  regressions  to assess  the  adult  wage structure  prevailing  prior  to the
establishment  of  MWs, identifying  the  subminimum  wage  population.  A  second  type
of  methodology  is  based  upon  time  series  analyses  that,  in  principle,  would
produce  more robust  results,  for  they  allow  a  more  direct  observation  of the
effect  of  MWs  on certain  market  outcomes. Cotterman  (1981)  discusses  the  issues
involved  in the  specification  of a system  of econometric  relationships;  Fels  and
Vaa  Boa (1981),  and  Paldam  and  Riveros  (1987)  apply  full  and  partial  causality
tests  between  MVe,  average  wages  and  other  macroeconomic  outcomes.
Surprisingly,  econometric  research  on the  role  played  by MWs  in LDCs  is
all  but  abundant. 2 At the  same  time,  most  of the  available  studies  on the  role
of  MWs in industrial  economies  have  been  based  on the  observation  of aggregate
relationships,  usually  estimated  on the  basis  of some  reduced-form  model. These
results  surround  much  of the  current  empirical  wisdom,  which in  turn  support
many  policy  recommendations  (see,  for  instance,  Drabick  and  Takayama  (1982)).3
Although  the  analytical  work  has  not  been  done  with  precision  for  developing
countries,  much of  the  policy  insights  stemming  from  research  in industrial
economies  have  been  enormously  influential.
The  role  actually  played  by the  MW in  developing  countries  is
influenced  most likely  by other  labor  market  characteristics  that  determine  not
only  its  potential  coveru.ge,  but also  their  connection  to other  observed
economic  outcomes. In  particular,  segmentation  is an  outstanding  feature  of
Latin  America's  labor  market  (PREALC,  1987)  which,  in turn,  constitutes  a major
issue  in  the  context  of  macroeconc-ic  adjustment.  In several  models  of
segmented  labor  markets  the  role  played  by the  MW is  considered  vital,
particularly  in  connection  with the  presence  of a large  and  competitive  informal
market  dominated  by the  presence  of  quasi-voluntary  unemployment.  This  view  of
the  labor  market  makes  the  MW a  crucial  variable  in the  context  of  macroeconomic
adjustment  [Lopez  and  Riveros  (1987)]. However,  in apparent  contradiction  with
the  idea  that  the  structure  of the  labor  market  is  more  complex  than  usually
assumed,  analyses  of the  role  played  by the  MW in  macroeconomic  models  has  not
relied  on  microeconomic  evidence. This  evidence  includes  some  relevant  factors
such  as partial  coverage,  and  the  direct  and  indirect  effects  of the  MW on
different  types  of  workers. 3
The  impact  of MW regulations  on specific  population  groups,  as studied
in industrial  economies  (Ragan  (1982),  Cunningham  (1982),  and  Linneman  (1982)],
is particularly  relevant  for  developing  countries. In fact,  the  concentration
of unemployment  among  certain  groups  of the  labor  force,  for  instance  the  young,
the  unskilled  and  women,  may  be an observed  result  of the  bias  contained  in
certain  protective  government  regulations,  which  are  enforced  in  varying  degrees
across  countries. 4 The  possible  bias  of  MW laws  against  more  disadvantaged
groups  of the  labor.  force  is  consistent  with the  observed  importance  of4
structural  unemployment  in  many  developing  countires. This  has lead  to
recommendations  for  the  deregulation  of the  labor  market  to attain  equilibrium.
Cross-sectional  studies  aimed  at identifying  the  actual  and  potential
coverage  of  HWs in terms  of labor  force  groups  face  the  statistical  problem  of
selectivity  bias.  In fact,  cross-sectional  studies  on wage setting  are  based  in
sample  results  that  exclude  the  unemployed,  thus  creating  a specification  error
which  implies  that  the  statistical  estimates  will  be influenced  by the  relative
size  of the  unobserved  population  in the  sample. 5 As  a  consequence,  given  the
unavailability  of data  or.  actual  wages  below  the  legal  MW level,  statistical
estimatcs  of the  coverage  of  MWs and  of the  damages  caused  to specific  groups
of the  labor  force,  will  be underestimated.  We attempt  to apply  a corrective
statistical  technique  to a  cross-sectional  analysis  performed  with Chilean  data.
1II. The  Case
The  performance  of the  labor  market  has  been  central  to the  process  of
macroeconomic  adjustment  in the  1970s  and  1980s  in  Chile,  as indicated  by
prevailing  unemployment  levels  and  enormous  wage fluctuations.  Given  that  the
role  of the  MW has  been  acknowledged  as important,  the  economic  policy  has put
strong  emphasis  in  keeping  them  down  in rnil  terms. However,  the  evidence
reported  by available  empirical  £tudies  does  not support  the  negative  effects  of
MWs  on employment.  For  instance,  on the  basis  of  aggregate  lator  demand
estimates,  Solimano  (1983)  has indicated  the  existence  of a low  potential
negative  impact  of the  MW on the  economy. On the  other  hand,  Co%rbo  (1981),
based  on  the  parameter  estimates  for  a production  function,  has calculated  an
important  negativc  impact  of the  MW on  manufacturing  employment.  With a  more
aggregate  model,  Paldam  and  Riveros  (1987)  found  that,  even  though  the  causality
between  increases  in the  MW and  the  average  wages  is significant,  the  causalitybetween  the  MW and  employment  is  not  as important.  However,  none  of these
studies  have applied  a  direct  test  on the  impact  of the  MW across  population
groups,  which  is likely  to  be more rele.  --  in  relation  to employment  effects
and  coverage  of specific  groups  of indivir  -ls.
The  methodology  developed  by Linneman  (1982)  was applied  to the  Chilean
case  by Castaneds  (1983). Linneman  examined  the  impact  of MWs  on employment  and
earnings  by estimating  the  adult  wage structure  which  prevailed  prior  to the
change  in  the federal  MW and  by identifying  the  sub-MW  wage  population  that
existed  at that  particular  point  in time. Likewise,  Castaneda  estimated  a log-
earnings  function  for  two  different  years  (1978  and  1981),  the  first  one  of
which  would  be characterized  by a 'low MW, (i.e.,  not being  *binding for  all
practical  purposes). He then  used  these  estimates  to forecast  potential
(econometrically-fitted)  wages  for  certain  groups  in  a subsequent  year,  when the
MW  was in fact  considered  *binding.  Hence,  the  fitted  money  wage  computed  for
the  first  year  was compared  with those  actually  perceived  by certain  prototype
human  capital  groups  during  the  second  year. Castaneda  concluded  that  a
significant  incidence  of  MWs  existed  for  young  groups,  thus  being  a major  reason
underlying  the  concentration  of unemployment  among  these  groups.
A major  problem  with Castaneda's  methodology  is the  specific  definition
of the  years  being  subjected  to a Obinding"  versus  a 'not  binding'  MW regime.
This  choice  requires  use  of certain  value  judgements  based  on the  comparison  of
the  current  real  MW level  vith some  of its  past  values. The  practical
implementation  of this  involves  some  conceptual  problems,  such  as the  selection
of the  more  appropriate  price  deflator 6 and  the  choice  of the  reference  period
for  the  comparisons.  As it  appears  clearly  in  figure  1,  the  choice  would  be
strongly  influenced  by inflationary  episodes,  while  the  specific  reference6
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period  will  very  much depend  upon  other  (unrevealed)  macroeconomic  aspects
determining  the  effectiveness  of a certain  MW level. Moreover,  selectivity  bias
affecting  OLS  estimates  could  make  the  comparisons  between  fitted  and  actual
wages  very  unreliable,  particularly  if the  bias  does  not remain  constant
throughout  time.
IV.  The  Model  and  the  Hypotheses
In this  paper  we apply  a correction  for  selectivity  bias  to estimate  an
earnings  function  for  several  different  years. The  basic  idea  is the  same
underlying  the  Linneman-Castaneda  approach,  but  our  test  does  not  rely  upon  any
specific  judgment  about  an initial  year serving  as a reference  for  comparisons.7
We also  applied  an appropriate  estimating  technique  to account  for  the  bias
caused  by  unobserved  units  in  the  sample. Our  basic  hypothesis  is  that
Castaneda's  conclusion  underestimates  the  unemployment  impact  of the  MW because
his  methodology  disregards  the  fact  that  the  population  covered  by the  MW is  not
actually  observed  in  wage data  as  unemployed  and  seeking  inactives  are  not
included  when estimating  an  earnings'  function.  We would  also  expect  that  MWs
are  more  binding  for  the  less  educated  and  the  young.
For the  purposes  of this  analysis,  the  MW is  considered  binding  if  the
marginal  productivity  of a  worker  is  less  than  the  actual  prevailing  MW.  We
assume  that  tl  productivity  of an individual  is related  to a  matrix  X of  human
capital  characteristics.  In following  Mincer  (1974),  and  assuming  that  the
marginal  productivity  of labor  is reflected  in  wages,  we postulate  a semi-log
relationship  between  wages  and  the  matrix  X of  human  capital  characteristics,  so
that
wt  '  Xi  P  +  Pi  l
where  p  is  a k-dimensional  vector  of  parameters,  Pi  is  a random  term,  i-l  ... T is
the  number  of individuals  in the  sample,  k is the  dimension  of X (the  number  of
independent  variables).
The  problem  we face  is  that  the  variable  wi is  not observed  in  all  its
range. In particular,  we will  not  observe  values  under  MW, i.e.,  the
distribution  is truncated  at  w - MW, implying  that  we will  have observed  wages
only if
w s  vi  iP  + Pi  t2l8
The  density  function  of the  truncated  normal  distribution  from  which  the  samples
are  drawn  can  be described  as
I  f4jp}  L-  MW-Xip
hCV/w  2  MW)  - i  f3  o  3f2  O  1  (3
h(v/w  <  MW)  - O  MW  S  w  <  +e
where  fl(  )  and  f,,(  )  are,  respectively,  the  density  function  and  the
distribution  function  of the  standard  normal. Estimation  of [13  by OLS  will
lead  to  negatively  biased  estimates  because  of the *unobserved  portion  of the
distribution.
The  log  likelihood  function  for  the  model  is
log~  L  T  o  (21r)lj2,j_  E  L_  i;  i9log1°  f2  [  4]
It is  possible  to  show (Maddala  (1983)]  that  the  likelihood  function  is
concave  and  that  its  maximization  according  to standard  procedures  leads  tot
1)
EViI/Xi)  - X  i  -C-  (53
VAR (w /X) -o2  o2  .i  +  f2  (61
f 2
The  downward  biases  of  OLS  and  the  maximum  likelihood  (ML)  estimates  are  evident
in the  expressions  (5[  and [63. Given  that  no observations  are  available  for  vi
S  MW, two-stages  methods  available  for  Tobit  models  are  not  applicab'e  either
(Amemiya  (1973)l.9
The  bias  involved  in  the  expression  [53  corresponds  to  the  usual  one
associated  to  the  *absence-of-a-relevant-variable  problem.  Another  form  to
express  (5)  is  the  followings
Ey1/il  x  . E(p/I  ef)  [73
where l'  is  the observability  index  W$  - XiP  standardized  by  the  variance  of
o  ().  The  ratio  - - - is  known  as  the  Mill's  ratio  and  it  can  be  taken
as  a  measurement  of  the  bias  of  the  OLS  or  ML  estimates.
Heckman  (1979)  proposed  to  estimate  the  model  by  including  the
missingw  variable  Xi  in  [13  based  on  the  fact  that  the  inverse  of  Mill's  ratio
it  a  monotone  decreasing  function  of  the  probability  that  an  observation  is
selected  into  the  sample.  The  proposition  is  to  estimate  the  parameters  of  the
probability  that  w  5  MW. For  this  purpose  we  will  use  a  probit  regression  for
the  full  sample.  From  these  estimators  one  can  compute  l M  and  hence  Xi 1
Subsequently,  the  value  Xi  may  be  used  as  an  extra  regressor  in  [13  thus
eliminating  the  selectivity  bias  contained  in  the  original  estimate  of  p.7
In  what  follows  this  technique  will  be  applied  to  the  analysis  of  the
significance  of  the  MW  play  in  terms  of  di' rent  labor  force  groups  in  Chile.
The  empirical  model  we  will  apply  is
w - X  op  + Xi7  +  Si  I8]
where  the  specification  of  Xi  includes  years  of  schooling,  market  experience,
market  experience  squared 8 and  an  interactive  variable  (schooling)x(experience).
The  basic  idea  is  to  divide  our  sample  into  a  group  for  which  MWs  are
binding  and  a  group  for  which  they  are  not. The  fitted  value  of t83  will  be




thus  allowing  us to  determine  its  impact  on unemployment  prob.bilities. 9 Hence,
we will  calculate,  for  a given  level  of  hum.i  capital  (expressed,  for  instance,
in terms  of age)  what proportion  of the  distribution  is  subject  to a  binding  MW.
According  to  this  methodology,  the  MW will  be binding  with different
intensities  for  different  age  groups. Therefore,  this  approach  is  more in line
with the  more recent  research  on this  subject  (Plant,  et al.,  1985)  and  the
logic  implicit  in the  operation  of the  MW in  the  economy. In Figure  2,  where
age  is  presented  on the  x axis,  the  tU.1s"  of the  distributions  for  each  age
group,  remaining  under  the  KJ level,  correspond  to the *coverage*  of the  MW for
that  specific  group. The  sum  of  all  these  tails'  for  alternative  values  of the
independent  variable,  corresponds  to  the  total  coverage  of the  MW.  The
Linneman-Castaneda  approach,  on the  contrary,  assumes  that  the  MW is  completely11
binding  for  sonme  (extreme)  age  groups. In  Figure  2, the  shaded  area  below  and
above  the  critical  age levels  (A*,  A**) represents  the  total  coverage  if  one
follows  their  methodology. Of  course  this  area  and  the  one  resulting  from  the
method  used  in  this  study  do  not  necessarily  coincide.
V.  The  Data
We will  use  the  data  provided  by the  Labor  Force  Survey  conducted
annually  by the  University  of  Chile  in the  Greater  Santiago  area. The  survey
questionnaire  has  been fairly  similar  throughout  time,  while  the  sample  size  and
its  distribution  has  been  reviewed  periodically  to account  for  the  city's
expansion. The  quality  of the  survey  and  its  representativity  is supported  by
the  consistency  of its  main reported  results  regarding  labor  force  categories
and  incomes. Corbo  and  Stelcner  (1980),  Uthoff  (1983)  and  Riveros  (1986)  have
used  this  information  to examine  wage setting  and  earnings  across  several  labor
force  groups,  and  their  conclusions  support  the  accuracy  of this  sample's
information  for  statistical  analysis. The  above  mentioned  study  by Castaneda
(1983)  used  this  same  data  source,  thus  allowing  a direct  comparison  with  our
empirical  results.
In this  study  we will  use  a sample  of  males  for  the  years  1968,  1977,
1980  and  1985,  thus  spanning  a  wide range  of economic  experiences  and  MW
regimes. The  sample  included  employed,  unemployed  and  discouraged  job  seekers
(seeking  inactives).  Inclusion  of seeking  inactive.  reflects  our  expectations
that,  under  a  binding  MW regime  there  will  be a  decline  in  participation  rates,
the  effect  of  which  we would  like  to account  for. 10 The  distribution  of the
sample  and  the  average  values  for  the  variables  are  presented  in  Appendix  1.12
VI.  The  Results
A.  Aggregate  Estimates
We first  estimated  the  value  of  X, through  estimation  of the
probability  of  belonging  to group  1 (employed)  or to  group  0 (seeking  inactives
and  unemployed).  We used  a  probit  model,  the  results  of  which  are  presented  in
Table  1.  In  general,  the  estimates  are  statistically  acceptable,  and  the
parameters  are  very  stable!  for  1977,  1980  and  1985. However,  the  observed
change  between  1968  and  1977  appears  very significant,  which  may  reflect  change
in  other  labor  market  conditions,  such  as  total  unemployment  levels,  government
intervention  and  industrial  composition  of employment.
Table  1
Probit  Participation  Functions
1968  1977  1980  1985
Schooling  .0766  .1169  .1314  .1273
(8.04)  *  (11.03)  *  (10.73)  *  (11.18)  *
Experience  .0694  .0952  .1023  .1096
(9.41)  *  (11.30)  *  (10.68)  *  (12.09)  *
Experience  Squared  -.0011  -. 0013  -.0014  -.0014
(-10.59)  *  (-11.44)  *  S-10.62)  *  (-11.78)  *
(School)x(Experience)  -.0013  -.0015  -.0025  -.0031
(-3.36)  *  (-3.43)  *  (-4.81,  *  (-6.75)  *
Constant  - 4926  -1.2402  -1.33Q3  -1.591
(-4.26)  *  (-8.91)  *  (-8.44)  *  (-10.38)  *
Notes:
-2  Log likelihood  ratio  207.96  336.13  254.79  257.71
t  ratios  appear  in  parentheses
*  Significant  with a 952  confidence  interval.13
As a second  step  we computed  the  value  of the  inverse  of  Miils'  ratio
on the  basis  of the  estimated  vector  parameters  and  we proceeded  to  use  standard
OLS  to  estimate  the  wage equation  [8J. The  results  presented  in Table  2 for  the
four  years  analyzed  show  that  consideration  of the  selectivity  bias is important
in estimating  a  wage function. This  is  indicated  by the  statistical
significance  of the  parameter  associated  to  Ai and  by the  important  change
observed  in  the  rest  of the  parameters  when  this  variable  is included  in  the
model. 11
Table  2
Estimated  Earning  Functions  Corrected
by Selectivity  Bias
Educ  Exp  Exp 2 EducExp  Const.  R2
1968  .144  .068  -. 00086  -.0011  - -3.28  .465
(30.3)*  (15.6)*  (-13.1)*  (-4.96)*  _  (-50.8)*
.18  .11  -.001  -.0018  1.10  -4.35  .466
(8.19)*  (4.08)*  (-4.08)*  (-3.84)*  1.74)  (-7.01)*
1977  .154  .067  -.00081  -.0011  - -2.01  .431
(27.6)*  (13.5)*  (-11.5)*  (-4.79)*  - (-24.6)*
.223  .126  -.0017  -.0022  1.30  -3.73  .44
(6.07)*  (6.42)*  (-5.92)*  (-5.26)*  (3.12)*  (-6.70)*
1980  .176  .080  -.0009  -.0020  - -3.42  .426
(28.0)*  (14.3)*  (-11.6)*  (-7.17)*  - (-38.3)*
.289  .174  -.0022  -.0044  1.95  -6.04  .43
(9.88,*  (7.18)*  (-6.60)*  (-6.61)*  (3.98)*  (-9.09)*
1985  .181  .087  -.0010  -.0017  - -2.96  .441
(26.5)*  (14.5)* (-12.9)*  (-5.86)*  - (-29.9)*
.52  .390  -.0050  -.0107)  5.13  -11.26  .45
(11.3)*  (9.47)*  (-9.27)*  (-8.61)*  (7.43)*  (-10.1)*
Notes:  t - ratios  appear  in  parentheses.
*  indicates  the  estimate  is significant  with a 95?  confidence  interval.14
The  observed  change  in  the  rates  of return  of schooling  and  experience
when  the  correction  for  selectivity  bias  is performed,  is certainly  striking.
For  instance,  in 1980  the  average  return  of schooling  without  correction  was 14
percent,  while  after  the  correction  this  value  increased  to 21  percent 12 In
1985  this  value  rose  from  15  percent  before  correction  to 33  percent  after
correction.
One  important  factor  in  overstating  the  magnitude  of the  bias  for
sample  selectivit  ,  is  the  presence  of seeking  inactives  in our  sample. As
explained  above,  this  group  was included  because  in  a developing  country  this
group  is  fundamentally  formed  by discouraged  job  seekers. However,  these
individuals  are  also  characterized  by lower  human  capital  than  those  actually
included  in  the  labor  force. As  a  result,  the  estimated  returns 13 increase
substantially  when this  group  is included  in  a  wage equation. As presented  in
Appendix  2, the  results  of an exercise  using  1987  data  show  that  the  inclusion
(or  exclusion)  of seeking  inactives  from  our  sample  does  make  a clear  difference
in terms  of the  final  estimates. 14
Although  the  inclusion  of seeking  inactives  introduces  an important
difference  in terms  of observed  changes  in  the  parameters,  it is important  to
keep them  in the  sample  in  order  to  consider  the  potential  impact  of the  MW on
them.  In fact,  we believe  that  a large  proportion  of seeking  inactives  withdraw
themselves  from  the  labor  force  because  of  MWs.  Consequently,  their  elimination
from  the  sample  will lead  to  underestimate  the  total  impact  of the  MW,  which  is
the  central  focus  in this  study.
In  order  to calculate  the  total  coverage  of the  MW in  the  economy,  we
used  two  alternatives:  the  Linneman-Castaneda  (L-C)  approach  and  the  approach
advanced  in this  paper. Using  the  L-C  method,  we computed  the  percentage  of
individuals  for  which  the  predicted  values  of  wages 15 was less  than  the15
prevailing  legal  minimum  in  each  year. The  results  appear  in the  first  row  of
Table  3.  We also  applied  the  tails'  method  explained  above,  the  results  of
which  appear  in the  second  row  of Table  3, allowing  a comparison  with the  L-C
method. In general,  our  estimates  show  larger  proportions  of  persons  affected
by  MWs than  those  associated  with the  L-C  method. 16 These  results  clearly
indicate  that  the  L-C  method  introduces  an important  underestimation  of the
actual  coverag,.  of the  VW.  Our  methodological  approach  can  be also  used  for
calculating  the  expected  increase  in the  population  affected  associated  with  a
certain  given  increase  in  MWs. 17
B.  Effect  of  MWs  upon  Specific  Groups
Table  4  presents  the  percentage  of different  population  groups  that
would  have  been  affected  by MWs (i.e.,  potential  'covered,  population)
Table  3
Proportion  of Persons  Affected  by the  MW
Method  1968  1977  1980  1985
Linneman-Castaneda  0.69  0.00  10.36  12.34
Tails  10.44  0.01  24.44  25.57
Source: Table  2
during  the  years  1980  and  1985. In  general,  the  groups  most  affected  by  MW laws
are  the  young  and  the  less  educated. This  information  also  shows  that  the
impact  of MWs  on unemployment  (and  probably  also  disguised  unemployment),  is
important  despite  of the  fact  that  MWs declined  substantially  in real  terms  in16
Chile  during  the  19809. Finally,  an interesting  observation  derived  from  our
estimates  is that  the  proportion  of women  affected  by the  MW is  lower  than  that
of  men.  One  interpretation  for  this  is  that  women  affected  by the  MW withdraw
themselves  from  the  labor  force  and  work in  the  informal  sector  and  in  other
productive  activities  which  are  not  totally  taken  into  account  by labor  force
surveys. Moreover,  it  has  been  observed  that  the  average  women  participating  in
the  labor  force  has an  above-the-average  human  capital,  and  it is likely  that  on
the  average  the  pi portion  of  women  covered  by the  MW is  in fact  less  than  that
for  men.
The  estimates  presented  in  Table  4  have  been  based  on the  total
predicted  wage  computed  with  the  OLS  estimates  of [81. As discussed  above,  this
method  underestimates  the  actual  coverage  of the  MW.  In  order  to analyze  a  more
accurate  computation,  we should  compute  the  change  in  the  cumulative  wage
function  with regard  to changes  in the  MW for  a given  human  capital  level. The
computed  density  function  (DF),  which  corresponds  to the  change  in  coverage  with
increases  in the  MW,  are  presented  in  Table  5 for  the  years  1980  and  1985,  and
for  some  specific  experience  and  schooling  years.
As shown  in  Table  5,  the  proportion  of young  individuals  affected  by an
increase  in the  MW appears  extremely  high (between  40 percent  and  50  percent).
In the  case  of the  older,  more  experienced  group,  the  potential  coverage
decreases  substantially  between  1980  and  1985,  suggesting  this  group  is  more
affected  by elements  related  to  a contractionary  global  economic  situation.  In
general,  however,  one  may  conclude  that,  in  considering  the  potential  coverage
seen  for  both 1980  and  1985,  the  relative  change  in  MWs is  more  binding  for  the
young  than  for  the  older  group. This is  consistent  with  the  relatively  larger
expansion  of  unemployment  among  the  young  between  those  years,  at the  same  time
that  the  prevailing  MW is  more  binding  in terms  of real  levels  (Figure  1).1817
Table  4
Proportion  of  Pfrsons  Affected  by the  MW Classification




4 - 10  45.6  47.0
10 - 20  11.3  13.4
21 - 50  2.2  4.7
51 - and  more  8.5  19.5
Education  (years):
less  than  8  26.5  39.5
less  than  12  8.3  12.3
12  0.0  0.0
12 and  more  0.0  0.0
Males  12.0  14.0
Females  7.4  9.6
Employed  8.4  9.6
Unemployed  17.5  16.1
Inactive  14.7  19.9
Table  5
Computed  Density  Functions
E(w)  DF(1980)  E(w)  DF(1985)
Years  of experience:
4 - 10  -1.54  0.50  -1.29  0.39
11 - 20  -0.89  0.27  0.04  0.18
21 - 50  -0.48  0.10  0.58  0.04
51  and  more  -1.82  0.47  -2.88  0.03
Schooling  years:
less  th,an  8  -2.18  0.32  -2.16  0.06
8  -1.13  0.38  -0.51  0.43
12  -0.28  0.06  -0.82  0.01
12 and  more  0.35  0.004  1.81  0.00
log  w  -1.59  -0.86
a  0.62  0.63
DF - Density  Function,  estimated  as f(  a  (v))18
C.  MW Coverage  and  Human  Capital
In addition  to the  above  exercise,  we also  estimated  the  relationship
between  human  capital  characteristics  and  the  probability  of  being  affected  by
MWs. With this  in  mind,  we defined  Vi as the  difference  between  E(W)  and  MW.
For  all  Vi <  0,  the  MW  was considered  binding. Subsequently,  we generated  a
dummy  variable  (PA)  with  value  1; if  Vi 2 0 (and  0 otherwise),  and  we regressed
PA against  certain  human  capital  characteristics.  The  results  appear  in
Appendix  3.  They  indicate  that,  in  general,  there  is a significant  positive
correlation  between  the  MW and  human  capital  variables, 19 thus  suggesting  that
the  young  and  the  less  educated  are  most likely  affected  by increases  in  the  MW.
Similarly,  and  with the  purpose  of  examining  the  effect  of  marginal
changes  in  the  degree  of "bindingness'  of  MWs,  we regressed  a dummy  variable
(EM)  with value  1 if  the  ith  individual  was  unemployed  or inactive  (and  0,
otherwise)  against  the  numerical  value  of  Vi. 20 As the  results  in  Appendix  3
show,  the  degree  of  bindingness  of  MWs,  as  measured  by the  numerical  value  of
Vi,  significantly  explains  the  probability  of  being  unemployed  for  all  groups.
The  quadratic  term  was,  however,  not  significant,  suggesting  that  the  percentage
change  in  unemployment  probabilities  was  approximately  the  same  across  groups
for  a given  change  in  Vi.
VII.  Concluding  Remarks
The  effect  of  MW policies  on the  employment  prospect  of specific  groups
of the  labor  force  has remained  largely  ignored  in the  empirical  research  done
on developing  countries. Despite  its  importance  in  connection  with  policies
seeking  to  minimize  the  negative  effect  of labor  protective  regulations,  this
issue  had only  been  approached  on the  basis  of the  evidence  offered  by studies19
prepared  for  industrial  countries. However,  the3e  studies  have  been  chiefly
based  on comparisons  of several  cross-sections,  with  no correction  for  sample
selectivity  biases  in  estimating  the  coverage  of  the  MW had  beer.  done.
Novetheless,  this  can  be an  extremely  important  factor  in  developing  countries,
where  the  absence  of affected  population  in  the  sample  is likely  relatively  more
important  than  in industrial  economies.
In this  paper  we have  applied  a statistical  technique  which  is
basically  different  from  the  traditional  one  used  to  analyze  the  effect  of  MWs
across  population  groups. The  statistical  analysis  presented  in this  paper
reveals  a significant  underestimation  when the  sample  selectivity  bias is  not
considered  in  estimating  a  wage equation. In particular,  we have shown  the
serious  underestimation  of the  rate  of return  to  human  capital,  which  in  turn
may lead  to  originate  misjudgments  about  investment  prospects.  We have  used  a
sample  in  which  we included  both  the  total  labor  force  and  the  seeking
inactives.  Even  if the  latter  are  excluded  from  the  sample,  a substantial
selectivity  bias is  still  apparent.
Our  results  also  show  that  MWs  are  more  binding  for  young  workers  and
for  the  less  educated,  groups  for  which  the  employment  probabilities  are
substantially  notably  affected. We have  estimated  that  an increase  in  the  MW
level  will  more significantly  affect  both  these  groups  than  other  groups,  thus
implying  the  existence  of unequitable  effects  in terms  of  unemployment.  More
specifically,  we have indicated  that  the  probability  of being  affected  by the
MVW,  and  thus  of being  affected  by its  employment  consequences,  is  highly  and
negatively  correlated  with the  human  capital  stock.
The  analysis  performed  indicates  that  the  MW is  a  powerful  tool  having
the  impact  of  creating  structural  unemployment.  The  results  do not  imply  that
the  MW is  necessarily  'bad'. However,  while  more  applied  research  is  necessary20
to  determine  specifically  the  groups  most  affected,  a general  policy  implication
is that  MVs should  not  apply  to young  workers,  or possibly  apprentices.  In
addition,  the  results  suggest  the  importance  of training  to increase  the  human
capital  stock  in the  labor  force,  in  order  to reduce  the  population  potentially
covered  by  MW laws.21
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APPENDIX  1
Sample
Year  Total  Males  Females
1968  0  1036  341  695
1  3010  2216  794
Total  4046  2557  1489
1977  0  1018  490  528
1  2885  2068  817
Total  3903  2558  1345
1980  0  884  402  482
1  2609  1849  760
Total  3493  2251  1242
1985  0  1259  584  675
1  2573  1804  769
Total  3832  2388  1444
1 - Employed
0 - Unemployed  and  seeking  inactives
Averages
(years)
1968  1977  1980  1985
Schooling  8.536  9.533  9.88,.  10.562
Experience  19.503  18.475  17.673  17.63924
APPENDIX  2
OLS  Wage Equations  fdr  1987t With  and  Without  Seeking  Inactives
Constant  Schooling  Exper.  Exper 2 SchExp.  R2
With  -2.85Su8  0.205  0.0799  -0.0008  -0.0019  - .47
(-28.63)  (30.32)  (13.02)  (-9.48)  (-6.917)  -
-10.97  0.5534  0.3446  -0.0042  -0.0095  5.36  0.49
(12.34)  (14.37)  (11.71)  (-11.1)  (10.97)  (9.19)
Without  -8.554  0.4441  0.2865  -0.0033  -0.0076  5.538  0.49'
(-11.21)  (13.70)  (10.21)  (-9.71)  -9.51  (7.54)
t-ratios  in  parentheses25
APPENDIX  3
A.  Probit  Estimates  of Being  Unaffected  by  MWs
1980  1985
Constant  -62.62  27.3
(-11.85)  (-13.9)
Schooling  6.16  2.55
(11.8)  (13.8)
Esp  2.42  0.97
(11.85)  (13.65)
Espz  -.0245  -. 010
(-11.8)  (-13.99)
SchoEsp  -. 336  -.015
(-5.91)  (-4.38)
DSex  .32  -. 023
(1.19)  (-.15)
PA - 0 (affected  by HWs;  Vi <  0)  362  473
PA - 1 (unaffected  by  MHs;  Vi 2 0)  3131  3359
-2  log  likelihood  ratio  2224.1  2496.2
B.  Probit  Estimates  of Being  Unemployed  or Inactive
1980  1985
Constant  1.31  1.13
(16.26)  (15.5)
Vi  -. 68  -. 82
(-5.5)  (-1.2)
Vi  0.11  -. 078
(1.41)  (-1.24)
DSes  -. 71  -. 70
(-14.26)  (-15.47)
-2  log  likelihood  ratio  425.5  427.3
Note: V.i  [  EM))26
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